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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTIONS
IN NEW MEXICO
In June, 1976, the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico in
Valley Utilities, Inc. v. O'Hare' expressed a feeling of uneasiness
with the procedures inherent in the state's class action rule.' Within
two months that uneasiness culminated in an order revoking adop-
tion of the rule.3 Since that order was issued without comment, it is
not clear whether the dissatisfaction expressed by New Mexico's
highest court is directed toward the utility of class actions in general
or toward the difficulties of applying the present rule. Permanent
enforcement of the order represents a revolution in civil procedure,
obliterating the representative action which had its genesis in
equity.4 On the other hand, a temporary "time out" may represent a
commendable intention to modernize this action, following the lead
of other jurisdictions.
This comment will examine the consequences of the recent actions
1. 89 N.M. 262,550 P.2d 274 (1976).
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(23) (Repl. 1970).
3. That Order states:
WHEREAS the Court heretofore promulgated and adopted by Order Rule
23(a) & (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the State
of New Mexico, which also appears in Replacement Vol. 4 of the New Mexico
Statutes 1953 Annotated at § 21-1-1(23)(a)(c); and
WHEREAS the Court now being of the opinion that the Order adopting
said rule, insofar as it embraced and accomplished the adoption of said Rule
23(a) & (c), should be revoked and vacated;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS CONSIDERED AND ORDERED that the Order
of this Court heretofore entered adopting Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the State of New Mexico, insofar, but only insofar, as it
embraced and accomplished the adoption of Rule 23(a) & (c) of said rules, be,
and it is hereby, revoked and vacated, and said Rule 23(a) & (c) shall have no
application to any suit or action filed in the district courts of the State of New
Mexico on or after June 15, 1976.
DATED at Santa Fe, New Mexico this 14th day of June 1976.
s/ LaFel E. Oman, Chief Justice
s/ John B. McManus, Jr., J.
s/ Donnan Stephenson, J.
s/ Samuel Z. Montoya, J.
s/ Dan Sosa, Jr., J.
15 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1362 (July 22, 1976).
4. See Reno, Notice and Due Process in Federal Class Actions: A Requium for Revised
Rule 23?, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 479, 490-91 (1975) [hereinafter cited as "Reno"] ; Note,
Rule 23 and Class Action Development, 12 Washburn L.J. 343, 345-46 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as "12 Washburn"].
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of the New Mexico Supreme Court. First, the effect of closing state
courts altogether to class litigants will be discussed; then, the pitfalls
inherent in New Mexico's rule 23 which may have led the New
Mexico court to revoke adoption of the rule will be reviewed.
Finally, the most commonly adopted alternative-the 1966 revision'
-will be evaluated to determine whether it is an adequate answer to
the questions raised by the New Mexico Supreme Court's actions.
THE EFFECT OF CLOSING STATE COURTS TO CLASS ACTIONS
Assuming arguendo that the New Mexico Supreme Court's ac-
tions6 of 1976 reflect a desire to eliminate permanently class actions
as a form of action in our state, 7 many potential plaintiffs, in par-
ticular, consumer and environmental groups which have made much
use of the device in the past,8 will certainly be denied a forum.
The utility of the class action procedure has been detailed by
commentators for many years.9 Beyond mere utility, however, a
recent decision involving federal class actions made it imperative that
state courts remain open to the class litigant.' 0 Indeed, the thrust of
that decision has been to deny access to the federal courts to many
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (1966).
6. Significant changes in the composition of the supreme court have occurred since the
July, 1976 order was issued. Since those changes, the court has not had the occasion to deal
with these issues. The present court's position is unknown.
7. New Mexico also has a statutory representative action under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-6-1
(Repl. 1970), which states:
When the question involved in a cause of action is one of common or
general interest to many persons, or where the parties are numerous and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court one [1] or more may sue or
defend for the benefit of the whole number of persons so interested in said
cause of action.
The validity of this section is highly suspect. First, it represents a legislative infringement on
the procedural rule-making powers of the judiciary. Second, it is unlikely that any court
would entertain an action brought under this section in light of the Supreme Court's Order.
8. Note that an amicus curiae brief was filed in Valley Utilities by the Consumer Protec-
tion Division of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico. See also
Note, The Products Liability Class Suit: Preventive Relief for the Consumer, 27 S.C.L. Rev.
229 (1975); Biderman, Consumer Class Action under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act,
4 N.M.L. Rev. 49 (1973); Rosenberg, Class Action for Consumer Protection, 7 Harv. Civ.
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 601 (1972).
9. See, e.g., Comment, Class Actions in Illinois: A Viable Alternative to Federal Rule
23?, 8 J. Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 113, 115 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 8 J. Marshall]; 12
Washburn, supra note 4; Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 684-85 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Kalven].
10. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). See also Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S. 332, 341 (1969), where the court recognized that actions based on separate and
distinct claims can "often be most appropriately tried in state courts."
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class litigants in order to reduce the backlog in those courts in the
expectation that the states would necessarily provide a forum.1
The most significant decision in this area was handed down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1973, in the case of Zahn v.
International Paper Co.' 2 Before Zahn, it had long been the rule that
named plaintiffs in a class suit involving separate and distinct claims
must each meet the requisite amount in controversy for jurisdictional
purposes (i.e., $10,000).' 3 In Snyder v. Harris, 4 none of the named
plaintiffs met that requirement. They argued that the nonaggregation
restriction enforced since 1911 should be reconsidered in light of the
rationale underlying the 1966 amendment to Rule 23. The Court
rejected this argument, basing its decision on past interpretations of
the jurisdictional amount section.
The Zahn case, however, presented a slightly different, but poten-
tially more significant problem. There, the named plaintiffs, suing a
single defendant in a nuisance action for polluting a lake in which
they owned riparian rights, each met the $10,000 requirement. Some
of the unnamed plaintiffs did not. The Court, relying on Snyder,
held that all plaintiffs, named and unnamed, must individually meet
the jurisdictional amount, or the case would not be heard as a class
action.
The Zahn decision has thus effectively relegated many potential
class actions to the state courts. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting
opinion, noted the practical effect this would have in states like New
Mexico which do not have class action procedures:
[I] f the State does not provide [a class action procedure] , litigation
of the claims of class members who ... lack the jurisdictional
amount.. . will produce a multitude of suits. And the chief in-
fluence mitigating that flood-the fact that many of these land-
owners' claims are likely to be worthless because the cost of assert-
ing them on a case-by-case basis will exceed their value-will do no
judicial system credit.' s
Unless New Mexico adopts a new, more viable class action procedure,
Justice Brennan's prediction may unfortunately come true.
11. See Note, Expanding the Impact of State Court Class Action Adjudication to Provide
an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1002, 1007 (1971); 8 J. Marshall,
supra note 9, at 113.
12. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
14. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). For a further discussion of these cases, see Horan, Class
Actions: Current Developments, 18 Tr. L. Guide 430, 432 (1975).
15. 414 U.S. 291, 308 (1973) (dissenting opinion). For further criticism of this decision,
see Comment, Federal Procedure: The Class Action -A Social Weapon Disarmed, 26 U. Fla.
L. Rev. 642 (1974).
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PROBLEMS UNDER THE FORMER RULE
Assuming that the supreme court does not contemplate a contin-
uing proscription on class actions in New Mexico, it must determine
what steps should be taken to modernize the class suit. To that end,
preliminary discussion of the former New Mexico rule and the prob-
lems it presented follows.
Prior to the July, 1976 order, New Mexico used the 1938 version
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'6 That version
classified actions according to the nature of the right involved.
These actions came to be labeled "true," "hybrid" or "spurious."'"
Thus a right held jointly or commonly gave rise to a true class action;
several rights in a specific property, to a hybrid action; and several
rights involving common questions of law or fact seeking a common
relief, to a spurious action.' ' There were requirements of numer-
osity and adequacy of representation as well.' I Although the rule
did not so state on its face, the members of the true class action were
bound by a class judgment, members of a hybrid class only to the
extent of the property involved, and members of a spurious class
only as to those present before the court prior to judgment.2" Notice
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(23) (Repl. 1970).
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one
[1] or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on
behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be
enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a pri-
mary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby
becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which
do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
(c) Dismissal or compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be
enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the
class in such manner as the court directs. If the right is one defined in para-
graph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given only if the court
requires it.
17. Although not a part of the rule on its face, these terms, favored by the progenitor of
the rule, Professor Moore, have become synonymous with it. See Note, Proposed Rule 23:
Class Actions Reclassified, 51 Va. L. Rev. 629, 630 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 51 Va. L.
Rev.]; Keeffe, Levy & Donovon, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Cornell L.Q. 327, 330 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as Keeffe] ; Kalven, supra note 9 at 702-04.
18. 51 Va. L. Rev., supra note 17 at 631.
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(23)(a) (Repl. 1970).
20. 51 Va. L. Rev., supra note 17 at 632-33. See also Note, Class Actions-Federal Rule
23 Amended, 31 Albany L. Rev. 127, 128-29 (1967); Kalven, supra note 9 at 706-07.
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of compromise or dismissal was required in the true class action, but
it was left to the discretion of the court in hybrid and spurious
actions. 2 I The rule required no notice to class members of the insti-
gation of the action.
Several key problems with the former rule are illustrated in the
Valley Utilities case. There, five individual plaintiffs and the Adobe
Acres Improvement Association brought suit on behalf of themselves
and 475 residents of the Adobe Acres Subdivision in Albuquerque.
The suit alleged that Valley, an independent supplier of water, had
failed to supply them with water meeting minimal quality standards.
The Bernalillo County District Court held that the 272 user-residents
who were Association members constituted a true class, while the
remaining nonmember-residents were a spurious class. At trial, the
jury awarded damages in the amount of $1000 to each class member.
The court entered a final judgment for the 272 members of the
true class, without requiring them to intervene or be notified of the
judgment. In its discretion, the court held open the judgment for the
spurious class members for a period of 60 days, and ordered that a
notice be sent to them apprising them of the judgment and their
right to intervene.
Valley appealed to the court of appeals, which held, at Valley's
request, that the trial court should have designated all plaintiffs as a
spurious class. The court remanded the case to the trial court with
the requirement that nonparticipating Association members be direc-
ted to intervene in the same manner as nonmembers, if they desired
to share in the judgment.
The supreme court agreed with the court of appeal's designation
of the class as spurious, but denied the post-judgment intervention
procedures permitted by the lower courts. The court concluded,
".... [TIhe only parties entitled to judgment in this action were
those who entered the lawsuit prior to the verdict by the jury.", 2
The Valley Utilities courts experienced one of the classical diffi-
culties associated with former Rule 23-"pigeon-holing" the class.
2 3
The plaintiffs and the district court labeled the action a combination
of true and spurious. The court of appeals and supreme court held
the action to be spurious only. The same problem has left other
courts befuddled. For example, in Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp.,2 1 the problem of classification was so significant that no two
21. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(23)(c) (Rept. 1970).
22. Valley Utilities, Inc. v. O'Hare, 89 N.M. 262, 264, 550 P.2d 274, 276 (1976).
23. 51 Va. L. Rev., supra note 17 at 633.
24. 27 F. Supp. 763 (D. E.D. Pa. 1939), rev'd, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd and
Summer 1977]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
consecutive courts could agree whether the class was hybrid, spuri-
ous, or for that matter, a proper class suit at all. The confusion
stems from the jural relations classifications developed by Professor
Moore, the labyrinthian quality of which is amusingly recounted in
the following passage:
That the courts themselves have been unable to differentiate clearly
between the various classifications of class suits as outlined by
Moore is well illustrated by the opinion of Judge Goodrich of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Pentland v. Drago
Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (C.C.A.3d 1945) ....
Judge Goodrich starts off by stating, with apparent approval, the
Judgments Restatement's illustration of what he terms a true class
suit, namely, that of a taxpayer "who sues county tax assessors on
behalf of himself and all other taxpayers alleging that his assessment
is invalid because a wrong method of assessment was used." He then
goes on to state that Moore gives an "explicit answer" as to when we
have a "true" class action. Yet Moore, upon whom Judge Goodrich
relies, places the taxpayer suit in the "spurious" category .... In
other words, Moore and the Restatement disagree and Judge Good-
rich seems to cite both with complete confidence.
The result of such confusion is that neither parties nor their attor-
neys can determine in advance of a court decision in their case into
which category their action is to be placed.2 s
This situation is no longer amusing, however, when one considers the
enormous consequences which flow from the pigeon-holing exercise.
The category into which a class member is placed is determinative of
whether he is bound by an unfavorable judgment or may share in a
favorable one, and whether he must intervene to do so. Indeed, the
plaintiffs in Valley Utilities found themselves caught in this dilemna.
On the assumption that Association members constituted a true
class, represented by the Associatioh, member-plaintiffs assumed that
they would share in the favorable judgment without individually
entering into the suit. To their dismay, when the appellate courts
changed their classification to spurious, Association members who
were not named and who had not intervened before the verdict were
precluded from recovery even though they had clearly, on the evi-
dence, been damaged by defendant Valley.2 6 This. result seems
unduly harsh, based as it is on a change in classification at the post-
judgment, appellate level, where the class litigant is effectively
remanded 311 U.S. 282 (1940), 39 F. Supp. 592 (D. E.D. Pa. 1941), rev'd and remanded
123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
25. Keeffe, supra note 17 at 335, n. 22.
26. 89 N.M. 262, 550 P.2d 274.
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precluded from fulfilling a new set of procedural requirements laid
down by the court.
Once it was finally determined that all plaintiffs were members of
a spurious class, the supreme court addressed the issue which was
dispositive in this action-that point in the litigation at which spuri-
ous class members must intervene in order to share in the judgment.
This question arose, as noted above,2 1 because of the lower courts'
decisions to hold the final judgment open for post-verdict interven-
tion. The supreme court disapproved of this procedure, stating:
"However, we will not in the name of 'efficiency' approve of a
procedure which invites nonparticipating parties to share in the spoils
of a judgment obtained by others even though those absent parties
will not be bound by the judgment if they decide to bring another
action rather than intervene." 2  The court was clearly persuaded
that notions of fairness require the class member to agree to be
bound while the outcome of the litigation is still up in the air.
Other courts have reached the opposite result based on the ration-
ale that to do otherwise would emasculate spurious class actions.2 9
One of the primary reasons for the use of the class action form is to
relieve the plaintiff, defendant and courts from the burden of litiga-
ting a potentially endless stream of claims arising from identical
facts, and instead permit all claims to be disposed of in one action.
To this end, it is in everyone's best interest that as many parties as
possible, within the limits of due process, be bound by the judgment.
Denial of the right of post-verdict intervention does not comport
with the thrust of this policy. As the court of appeals in Valley
Utilities succinctly put it:
[W] e do not understand why the defendant would want the result
otherwise. If we were to deny the absent members' right to inter-
vene, the defendant would be faced with separate suits by each of
them, with the result foreordained. 30
However, this desirable binding effect cannot be mutual under
former Rule 23 as the supreme court would have it, because the lack
of notice provisions in the rule deprive a class member of due process
if the result is unfavorable.
The opting-in requirement of former Rule 23, as interpreted by
the court in Valley Utilities, would seem to inhibit the representative
27. See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
28. 89 N.M. at 264, 550 P.2d at 276.
29. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
dismissed 371 U.S. 801 (1963); York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2nd Cir. 1944).
See also 51 Va. L. Rev., supra note 17 at 649; Kalven, supra note 9 at 695, 699-701.
30. O'Hare v. Valley Utilities, Inc., 89 N.M. 105, 111,547 P.2d 1 147, 1153 (1976).
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character of the spurious class action more than is functionally neces-
sary. The court's requirement that class members take affirmative
steps to intervene at the inception of the action was based on notions
of "fairness," '31 and goes further than due process would mandate.
As the court was well aware, this makes the spurious class action
little more than a device for permissive joinder,3 2 already available
under Rule 20."3 The inconsistency embodied in this view was aptly
illustrated in the following passage:
But if other members of the class must become parties of record
before the trial, the rule is reduced to saying that, where it is imprac-
ticable to bring all parties before the Court they must nevertheless
be brought before the Court. 
3 4
In addition, the opt-in requirement forces class members who do
not receive notice, fail to understand its full import, or neglect to file
timely intervention to bring numerous later actions, in which the
defendant will be estopped from denying liability. 3 s The "fore-
ordained result" of this procedure has been stated thus:
The District Court has just decided that the Defendant is liable to
those in these same legal positions as the Plaintiffs. The Defendant in
resisting participation must contend not that he is not liable to the
others, but that each must harass him with a separate suit, and
ultimately, that justice has been made too quick, too convenient,
too exact and too complete. 3 6
The foregoing discussion of the problems encountered by the
courts in applying former Rule 23, coupled with the restrictions on
class access to federal courts, demonstrate the need for an effective
class action rule. The majority of jurisdictions have addressed this
problem by adopting the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 3  which was drafted in response to several
31. Valley Utilities, Inc. v. O'Hare, 89 N.M. 262, 264, 550 P.2d 274, 276 (1976).
32. Id.
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(20) (Repl. 1970).
34. Kalven, supra note 9 at 699.
35. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1962),
cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963).
.36. Kalven, supra note 9 at 701.
37. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(Vol. 7
CLASS ACTIONS IN NEW MEXICO
of these problems. However, as Professor Kaplan, Reporter of the
1966 Rules Committee, observed: "[WI e must await the experience
of 25 years at least before we can know all the good and ill stored in
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class'
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied; and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the.class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other mem-
bers not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or. impede their
ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to 4ct. on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only. individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concen-
trating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as
a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the cir-
cumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and .(C) any member who does not request exclusion may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivi-
sion (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment
in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or
not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom
the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not
requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule
shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the
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the promise of the new Rule." 3  As New Mexico now prepares to
select its rule, ten of Professor Kaplan's 25 years have passed, making
available to our state the first wave of praise and criticism by the
courts and commentators. While it is not within the scope of this
Comment to discuss in any detail these criticisms, they will be noted
in discussion of the changes the new rule has brought.3
THE 1966 REVISED RULE 23
The 1966 amendment presents several innovations in class action
procedure. Moore's jural relations classifications were abandoned in
favor of classifications which turn on the practical effect that a class
adjudication will have on representatives, absentees and opposing
parties.4 ° It specifies the binding effects of a class judgment; 4 1 in
doing so, it provides that members of what was formerly a spurious
class are bound, unless they affirmatively choose not to be.4 2 By
specifying notice requirements, it incorporates both the demands of
due process and notions of fairness. Finally, the new rule places great
reliance on the discretion of the trial judge throughout the class
action proceeding, providing him with detailed guidelines.
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for
the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present
claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing condi-
tions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation
of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with
similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under
Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to
time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dis-
missal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner
as the court directs.
38. Conversation between Judge Frankel and Professor Kaplan, quoted in Frankel,
Amended Rule 23 from a Judge's View, 32 ABA Antitrust L.J. 295, 302 (1966) therein-
after cited as Frankel].
39. Some amendments and clarifications of the new rule, in light of the insights gained
from Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), are suggested in a recent article,
Jacobs & Cherkasky, The Effects of Eisen IV and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rule
23, 12 U. S.D. L. Rev. 1, 31-38 (1974). For other suggested changes, see Reno, supra note 4
at 5 11-15; Note, Amending Rule 23in Response to Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 53 N.C. L.
Rev. 409 (1974).
40. See 51 Va. L. Rev., supra note 16 at 642.
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
42. Id.
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The Valley Utilities case demonstrates the difficulties courts face
in pigeon-holing class litigants in accordance with whether their
rights are joint, common or several. As noted above, the singular yet
highly significant consequence of this classification is to determine
who will be bound by the judgment and the procedures to be fol-
lowed, without regard to the necessity or equity of doing so in a
particular situation. The new rule avoids this anomoly by focusing on
the effect that a class determination would have on all parties, i.e.,
deciding who, in equity, ought to be bound. The drafters of the 1966
amendment singled out three situations in which treatment as a class
seemed most appropriate. 4 3 Thus, where an opposing party is faced
with numerous claims the outcome of which might direct him to
pursue conflicting courses of action with the various parties, the
drafters felt this ambiguity could be disposed of by adjudicating the
claims in one suit which binds all persons who fit within the descrip-
tion of the class.
In subsection (b)(3) of the new rule, use of the class action pro-
cedure is allowed in situations other than those detailed, where there
is a common question of law or fact, in the name of convenience and
economy. This is permitted, in contrast to the former rule, only
where the court in its discretion determines that the rights of absent
parties are adequately safeguarded. To that end, the rule directs the
court to determine that a class action is superior to other available
methods, and that the common questions predominate over indi-
vidual differences.4 4 Viewing the facts of the Valley Utilities case
from this effect-oriented approach, it seems clear that all 475 plain-
tiffs shared a common question of fact-Valley's liability for supply-
ing substandard water-and thus would have been classified a (b)(3)
action under the new rule.4 s
The new rule obviates the necessity for the protracted discussion
of one-way intervention carried on by the Valley Utilities courts.
Because the former rule required class members to opt-in, it was
obviously necessary to determine when they must do so. Since the
new rule binds a class member unless he "opts-out," questions of
intervention and its timing become irrelevant. While at first blush it
43. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A)(B), (b)(2).
44. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
45. The Valley Utilities plaintiffs sought only compensatory damages. It was abundantly
clear at the outset of the litigation that a damage verdict for class plaintiffs could have no
practical effect on the rights or interests of non-class water consumers with respect to Valley
Utilities, Inc. ((b)(1)(B) action). Valley Utilities, Inc. could not be subjected to inconsistent
judgments with respect to the various members of the class, since any remedy flowing from
the facts would not conflict with an award of damages ((b)(1)(A) action). Finally a b(2)
action is inapposite since plaintiffs did not request injunctive or declatory relief.
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might seem unusual to bind parties who have not taken affirmative
steps to enter the suit, the procedure reflects a realistic view of the
average class member:
The reasoning ... relates to the fundamental conception ... of
classes comprised of little people, who don't normally have much
dealing with lawyers or with legal formalities .... As [the Advisory
Committee] saw it, the likelihood is that this guy will routinely
ignore, or at least fail to respond to, the notices contemplated under
(c)(2). On that premise, the vote went the way we see, to the effect
that a non-response means inclusion rather than exclusion. 
4 6
This view has been criticized by others:
Failure to opt-out cannot be interpreted as interest in the class ac-
tion. This is shown by the fact that in settled cases, where members
of the class get an automatic recovery by responding, most of those
who do not opt-out do not bother to file claims. The result, there-
fore, is not the consolidation of many viable claims in a single simpli-
fied lawsuit, but rather the generation of claims for people who have
no interest in pursuing them.4 7
By choosing to recognize the former rationale, the new rule better
effectuates one of the underlying premises of class actions -avoiding
multiplicity of litigation. Obviously, the more inclusive the class, the
better this result will be reached.
Due process requires timely notice to absent members of a (b)(3)
class and as a natural corollary to the opt-out provision of (c)(2).'
That mandate is met in (c)(2), which states in relevant part:
(c) * * *
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the
Court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable, including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort. (Emphasis added) 4 9
46. Frankel, supra note 36 at 299. See also Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (D. S.D.
N.Y. 1969).
47. Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 377-78
(1972).
48. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Although subsection (c)(2) re-
quires notice only in (b)(3) actions on its face, some courts faced with the question of
notice in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions have held this to be a due process requirement. See
Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys., 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972);
Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465 (D. W.D. Pa. 1972); Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539 (D. W.D. Pa. 1971); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2nd
Cir. 1968).
It has been suggested that the opt-in procedure of the former rule, combined with
adequate notice, might be acceptable in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions. See Labowitz, Class
Actions in the Federal System and in California: Shattering the Impossible Dream, 23
Buffalo L. Rev. 601, 649 (1974).
49. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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In addition, notice may be required in the discretion of the trial
court in the other actions under subsection (b) of the rule.' 0
The former rule expressly gave the court discretion only with
regard to compromise or dismissal of the suit.' ' In other areas, the
court became little more than a "judicial umpire with most of the
initiative left in the hands of the litigants."I 2 The new rule, which
stresses the effect of a class judgment on the parties, allows for
procedures to be tailored to the needs of the individual case. To
accomplish this, the trial judge is afforded a much wider discretion
throughout the proceedings. He may determine the scope of the
issues to be tried as a class,5 ' whether subclasses will be appro-
priate,' and frame any order he deems necessary to insure effective
management of the action.5 I In addition, he is specifically directed
to exercise that discretion to determine whether a class action should
be maintained,5 6 particularly with regard to (b)(3) actions.
The increase in judicial discretion allowed in class actions has re-
ceived mixed review. Mr. Justice Black dissented to the adoption of
the 1966 version precisely because it allowed such wide discretion:
I particularly think that every member of the Court should examine
with great care the amendments relating to class suits. It seems to me
that they place too much power in the hands of the trial judges and
that the rules might almost as well simply provide that 'class suits
can be maintained either for or against particular groups whenever in
the discretion of a judge he thinks it is wise.' The power given to the
judge to dismiss such suits or to divide them up into groups at will
subjects members of classes to dangers that could not follow from
carefully prescribed legal standards enacted to control class suits.
In addition, the rules as amended, in my judgment, greatly aggra-
vate the evil of vesting judges with practically uncontrolled power to
dismiss with prejudice cases brought by plaintiffs or defenses inter-
posed by defendants. The power to dismiss a plaintiff's case or to
render judgments by default against defendants can work great harm
to both parties. There are many inherent urges in existence which
may subconsciously incline a judge towards disposing of the cases
before him without having to go through the burden of a trial.5 '
But a noted scholar, Professor Homburger, has championed this step
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
51. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(23)(c) (Repl. 1970).
52. 51 Va. L. Rev., supra note 17 at 650.
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
57. Statement of Mr. Justice Black, 39 F.R.D. 272, 274 (1966).
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as quite necessary in light of the complexities the court must face in
these suits:
The management of class actions requires a strong and active
court which does not content itself with passing on the propriety of
the maintenance of the class action, but is willing to share respon-
sibility with the parties in developing the case. Class actions require a
new approach to the functions of the courts and parties, reminiscent
of the civil law approach where the judge often participates in the
proceedings, guiding and assisting the parties, even at the risk of
overinvolvement. In short, the success of the class action may well
depend on the willingness and the capability of the court to work
with the parties in planning and organizing the trial in the interest of
the efficient and fair adjudication of the litigation. The principle of
adequacy of representation by the representative parties must be
complemented by the principle of adequacy of judicial management
in order to justify dispensing with those fundamental rules that guar-
antee to each party his day in court....
CONCLUSION
If the New Mexico Supreme Court's order of July, 1976 reflects a
general antagonism toward the continuing utility of the class action
procedure, the small litigant whose claim would not justify the ex-
pense of an individual suit would no longer have a realistic hope of
recovery. Under these circumstances, such plaintiffs, in particular the
consumer, can be cheated with impugnity. If, on the other hand, the
order reflects a commitment to revitalize the class action procedure,
it should be viewed as a necessary and timely step in the process of
judicial reformation. The 1966 amendment represents a substantial
improvement over the former rule. Nevertheless, certain aspects of
the new rule have already received criticism, and other problems will
doubtless emerge in the remaining fifteen of Professor Kaplan's 25
years.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has constituted an advisory
committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure for our state." 9 When this
committee focuses upon class action procedures,6" the 1966 ver-
sion's emphasis on classification by effect and the provision of
adequate notice should be retained. In line with recent federal deci-
sions, the committee might well consider including explicit notice
58. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 609,
657-58 (1971).
59. Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Appellate Procedure for
Civil Actions, Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico.
60. Action should be taken quickly. The statutes of limitations are running while the
committee works, once again creating a potential forum denial.
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requirements for all class actions. The committee should further con-
sider whether New Mexico ought to follow the lead of other jurisdic-
tions in regard to the controversial issues of opt-in versus opt-out
notice and the extent of judicial discretion. Finally, no matter what
specific provisions are chosen, they should reflect a recognition that
New Mexico's courts remain a viable forum for the litigants whose
claims are too small individually to allow economical use of the
courts.
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